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INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND CONSUMER




The recent history of consumer protection initiatives by regulators and
legislators shows an increasing interest in information disclosure. The
scope of these initiatives is wide, ranging from standards for warranties
to requirements for provision of comparative performance, cost, and in-
gredient information (including unit pricing, nutrient and octane labeling,
Truth-in-Lending, and Truth-in-Packaging), and including the various im-
plications of the fairness doctrine.
In view of the increasing acceptance of the consumer's "right to know"1
and the appeal of legislation and regulations that are relatively inexpen-
sive to enact and enforce, information disclosure will continue to be an
area of considerable activity. An additional appeal of this form of con-
sumer protection is its consistency with freedom of contract values. That
is, "disclosure regulation seeks only to persuade rather than to compel
purchases according to a predetermined model."'2 Nonetheless, such leg-
islation is usually based on an implicit or explicit model which assumes
that consumers have a strong desire for information, and that they are
competent to use the information to choose the product which offers the
greatest value for the least money.- Thus, the ultimate appeal of disclo-
sure legislation is that it promises to have a desirable effect on consumer
behavior.
t The authors have served as consultants to the National Commission on Consumer
Finance and are indebted to the Commission for financial support of this study.
The major results of this study, along with other related research evaluating Truth-
in-Lending, are reported in NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT
IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 10 (1972), and in I NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE
STUDIES (1973).
The authors wish to thank Professors Robert P. Shay, Robert W. Johnson, and
Terry Deutscher for their advice and assistance throughout the study.
* Assistant Professor of Marketing, Graduate School of Business, Columbia Uni-
versity, B.S. (Economics), 1965, M.B.A., 1967, Ohio State University; Ph.D., 1973,
Stanford University.
** Associate Professor of Marketing, Graduate School of Business, Stanford Uni-
versity, B.A.Sc., 1959, University of British Columbia; M.B.A., 1962, University of
Western Ontario; Ph.D., 1967, .Columbia University.
1 CONSUMER ADVISORY COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FIRST
REPORT (1963).
2 Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure, Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 U. WIS. L. REV. 400.
3 Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967).
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The appealing qualities of disclosure legislation are most clearly seen
in the case of the Truth-in-Lending Act 4 (TIL or Act), enacted in May,
1968, which requires disclosure of the dollar finance charge and the an-
nual percentage rate of interest for virtually all consumer credit transac-
tions. The dollar finance charge information is presumed to give consum-
ers a basis for comparing the economic advantage of paying cash rather
than using credit. To some degree this information was available in pre-
TIL contracts. However, the annual percentage rate of interest informa-
tion was not previously available on a uniform basis, and thus could not
be used to compare rates offered by different credit sources.- The method
for calculating the annual percentage rate of interest required by the
TIL legislation yields much higher rates than those disclosed by lenders
before the effective date of the Act. For this reason, it was expected that
the improved knowledge of interest charges13 would produce a greater de-
gree of cost-effective comparative shopping and influence the decision
whether to use credit in part or at all.7 Once these presumed effects took
4 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1970). Title I of the Act is the Truth-in-Lending Act.
5 According to the National Commission on Consumer Finance:
Prior to enactment of TIL, information given consumers about their
credit arrangements ranged from very little to what TIL now requires.
Most consumers were told the amount of their monthly payments and
the due dates. Provisions for additional information varied widely
among credit grantors, types of credit, and states.
The greatest lack of uniformity was in the quotation of the amount
and rate of the finance charge. Some credit grantors provided neither
figure, showing only the number and amount of monthly payments and
the dollar sum. While many creditors disclosed the dollar amount of
the finance charge or provided enough data so that it could be ascer-
tained, they stated the rate of charge in a variety of ways.
NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES
169 (1972) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER CREDIT].
The methods of disclosure included no quotes at all about rates of finance charge,
quotes in terms of a monthly rate (e.g., 1.5 percent per month), discount rates, add-on
rates, as well as fragmented systems that combined add-on or discount rates and a
flat fee or extra charge. Virtually no one offering consumer credit at that time stated
the rate of charge as an annual percentage rate.
0 The degree of ignorance and confusion existing prior to enactment of the Truth-
in-Lending Act is well documented. Separate surveys by Due and Hoskins in the
1950's revealed that more than two-thirds of all consumers making recent purchases
were completely ignorant of the annual percentage rate of interest. See Due, Con-
sumer Knowledge of Instalnent Credit Charges, 20 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 162,
164 (1955); L. Hoskins, Interest Rates Paid for Automobile Credit by San Francisco
Bay Area Families, September, 1958 (unpublished thesis in University of California
Library). Later studies by Juster and Shay and by the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan again illustrated the fact that the vast majority of consumers
were either totally unaware of interest rates or unrealistically low in their estimates.
A surprising number of consumers (28 percent) thought they had paid 6 percent per
annum, giving rise to what was termed, "the 6 percent myth." T. JUSTER & R. SHAY,
CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVES-
TIGATION (National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper No. 88, 1964).
See also G. KATONA, W. DUNKELBERG, G. HENDRICKS & J. SCHMIEDESKAMP, 1969
SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES 19 (1970).
7 Whether the consumer could or would behave according to this theoretical frame-
work was not known prior to the passage of the Truth-in-Lending Act. Some evi-
dence from Massachusetts, which had required this kind of disclosure in 1967, indi-
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hold, it was further assumed that sellers would be forced to compete, on
the basis of interest rates, with the result being that the total cost of a
purchase, including finance charges, would be reduced.
Those who criticize the reliance on disclosure, and TIL in particular,
to achieve the described goals disagree with the above scenario and argue
instead that little benefit will come from this form of consumer protec-
tion. These arguments are based on the assumptions that most consumers
cannot or will not understand and learn the disclosed information, and
that even if they do become knowledgeable, they will not use the infor-
mation during their purchase decisions. For example, Homer Kripke ar-
gued that credit buying patterns were influenced more by credit availabil-
ity than by cost information and that, for this reason, TIL would not
benefit the low-income buyer.9
This article offers some empirical insight into the debate over the effi-
cacy of disclosure legislation. The primary concern is the effect of the Act
on (1) the level of consumer knowledge of interest rates and finance char-
ges; (2) the extent of comparison shopping; and (3) the decisions to post-
pone purchases, to use cash instead of credit, or to reduce the finance
charges by increasing the downpayment or reducing the number of pay-
ments. The article also evaluates patterns of consumer behavior and




The data in this study were obtained from personal interviews with
793 California heads of households in October, 1970, and reinterviews
with a random subsample of 196 households in July, 1971. In the initial
survey, 641 respondents were part of a probability sample in which each
family in the state theoretically had an equal chance of being interviewed.
cated that there would be a relatively mild impact on consumer behavior:
It now appears that the results prophesied by both sides were rather
extravagant and overdrawn. Proponents of disclosure claimed benefits
to the consumer which were obviously based on the assumption that
borrowers would effectively take advantage of this new device, but for
the most part they simply have not done so....
If the proponents were overly optimistic, the critics were too pessi-
mistic.
R. PULLEN, The Impact of Truth-in-Lending Legislation: The Massachusetts Experi-
ence 56 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Report No. 43, 1968).
8 Senator William Proxmire particularly emphasized the importance of comparison
shopping:
The main thrust of the Truth in Lending bill is to promote more ef-
fective price competition in the consumer credit industry. At you know,
competition is the essence of our free enterprise system. The workings
of the competitive market insure that Consumers will be able to obtain
the kinds of goods they want at the lowest possible price.
CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, at 171-72.
9 Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1 (1969).
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This will hereafter be called the representative sample. A separate prob-
ability sample of 142 black households was drawn from areas throughout
the state with high concentrations of black families.
The black sample supplements the statewide survey and enables us to
study more reliably the problems, attitudes, and behavior of black con-
sumers. 10 From a statistical standpoint, it is inappropriate to combine the
two samples when generalizing from the sample to the California popula-
tion; in these cases, therefore, only the representative sample will be used.
Where the focus is on the differences between groups within the popula-
tion, such as blacks and whites, the two samples can be joined without
serious bias to the result.'1
The baseline (TI) survey gathered extensive data about each respon-
dent's knowledge of and attitudes twoard consumer credit, history of
credit usage, assets and debts, plus a broad range of demographic and
socio-economic variables. If the family had purchased a car or major
household durable having a price in excess of one hundred dollars during
the previous year, an additional set of questions was asked. These ques-
tions retraced the important decisions that were made during the purchas-
ing process, from the recognition of the need to purchase, through the
search and evaluation of alternatives, to the actual purchase. For items
bought on credit, the additional questions captured details of the credit
transaction. Questions were asked of only those respondents who were
directly involved in the purchase decision process.
Among the 641 respondents in the representative sample, 72 percent
had purchased a car or major household durable in the previous year.
Some form of consumer credit was used by 53 percent of these buyers.
For the black sample, 70 percent made a qualifying purchase, of which
73 percent were bought on credit. Combining the two samples showed a
total of 319 credit purchases and 242 cash purchases.
The reinterview (T2) subsample was representative of the baseline sam-
ple with one exception. Because of a deliberate effort to reinterview re-
spondents who had reported a credit purchase prior to TI, the T2 sub-
sample was biased toward households with greater credit experience.
Analysis of the data in this reinterview survey, as well as experience with
similar panel designs augmented with a control group, suggest that the
reactive or conditioning effect on participation in the baseline survey on
reinterview responses was negligible.
During the reinterview, the questions on credit knowledge, attitudes,
10 The California population includes about 6 percent blacks and 7 percent Chi-
canos. A probability sample of 800 families would be expected to include only about
50 families of each group, too few for reliable estimates of behavior patterns.
11 A separate analysis showed that the basic demographics of black families in the
black sample were very similar to the demographics of blacks in the representative
sample. The fact that a disproportionate number of black families were included in
the sample will not seriously bias the results when the focus is on between-group
differences. For elaboration of the reasons for this, see CONSUMER BEHAVIOR OF IN-




and experience were repeated. If a major purchase had been made in the
interim, the purchase process was retraced, as in the first interview, by
asking additional questions.
B. Limitations of the Data
The interviews outlined above were conducted by professional inter-
viewers who were thoroughly trained and supervised by a highly respected
research firm. The questionnaire was also carefully planned and pretested
before the survey.
Despite the precautions taken, three sources of potential bias must be
considered: nonresponse error, response error, and sampling error. Non-
response error can occur because individuals included in the sample fail
to complete the interview for any reason. In the representative sample,
46 percent actually completed the interview; the majority were either ill,
too busy, suspicious, not interested, or not at home after three callbacks.
A separate followup study to measure the potential nonresponse bias re-
vealed no significant differences between the demographics of respondents
and nonrespondents.
Response errors result from poorly constructed questionnaires, lack of
respondent interest, memory loss, deliberate falsification, and other re-
lated causes. Measuring these biases is difficult, but by asking multiple
questions on a topic and by debriefing the interviewers, it is possible to
infer where misunderstanding and misstat,ment occurred. These evalua-
tions indicated that once the respondents' initial suspicions were lowered,
they became very involved in the interview and had little trouble recalling
recent purchase behavior.
Sampling error arises because not everyone in the total population was
interviewed. Most consumer surveys are slightly biased toward families
with higher levels of education and income because of the problems of
including migrants and extremely low-income groups in the sample. This
survey was no exception in this regard.
Except for the minor sampling bias and the other limitations noted
above, the data appear to offer representative snapshots of the California
populace in October, 1970, and July, 1971. A separate analysis indicates
that in most respects the results from this survey can be generalized to
the United States population. 12 California families tended to be somewhat
younger and better educated, and to use credit more widely, but their at-
titudes toward credit and knowledge about credit terms were similar to
those across the nation.
12 Using data from a nationwide survey, California consumers were compared with
the rest of the nation on a number of demographic, attitudinal and behavioral vari-
ables. The survey, conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan, included 316 California and 2849 non-California households. Except for
the tendencies noted in the text, no significant differences were found between the
two consumer groups. California consumers may differ in some respects from con-
sumers in other regions, but for the country as a whole the differences were not sub-
stantial.
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II. CONSUMER KNOWLEDGE OF CREDIT TERMS
Whether the goal of the Truth-in-Lending Act is to facilitate compar-
ison shopping or to encourage greater discretion in the use of credit, con-
sumers must first be reasonably familiar with the terms of a credit trans-
action. Since TIL places no direct controls on the behavior of consumers,
changes in credit behavior theoretically result from a two-stage process:
first, acquisition of knowledge about credit rates and charges; and second,
action in light of this information. This section examines what has hap-
pened to the level of consumer knowledge since the Act went into effect.
A. Previous Research
Consumer ignorance and misunderstanding about credit rates and char-
ges was noted earlier. Summarizing the principal findings of the research
conduct prior to TIL, Silverman concluded:
Only a small proportion of consumers appear to possess ac-
curate knowledge or understanding of rates of interest either
as effective rates [annual percentage rates] or add-on rates.
We cannot assume that consumers do not possess accurate
information as to the dollar credit costs associated with a credit
purchase. There has not been a reported study that focuses
specifically on dollar credit cost awareness.
1 3
In June, 1969, the Federal Reserve Board conducted a large nation-
wide telephone and personal interview survey to determine consumer
knowledge of interest rates before TIL was implemented. The report on
this study, which was submitted to Congress, corroborated Silverman's
conclusion:
Approximately two-thirds of those with home improvement or
automobile loans, three-fifths of those with personal cash loans,
and less than one-half of those with appliance and furniture
loans thought they knew the interest rate on their debt.
However, with the possible exception of home improvement
loans, the rates given by these borrowers appear unrealistically
low-probably a reflection of thinking the contract rate of in-
terest represents the annual percentage rate. Fully 70 per cent
of those who indicated they knew the annual rate on their auto-
mobile loan indicated it was 7 per cent or less, while approx-
imately three-fifths of those stating rates on personal loans and
more than one-half of those giving rates for appliance and fur-
niture loans reported similarly. Only in the case of appliance
and furniture credit did as many as one-fourth of the respon-
dents report a rate above 11 per cent.
14
13 M. Silverman, Awareness of Credit Costs; Its Role in the Decision Process of
the Low-Income Negro Consumer 52 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Stan-
ford University Library).
14 U.S. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANN. REP. TO CON-
CRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1969, appendix B, at 5.
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Fifteen months later, the Federal Reserve Board conducted a second
nationwide survey. Shay and Schober used the two surveys to measure the
changes in consumer knowledge during this period. Finding substantial
increases in all levels of knowledge regarding the annual percentage rate
of interest (APR), they reported that
the greatest increase was shown for bank credit cards followed
by retail revolving credit and all types of closed end credit.
For every 100 respondents in 1969 who did not know the APR
or made an obviously inaccurate estimate, only 50 in 1970
showed a similar response on bank credit cards; 68 for retail
revolving credit; and 72 for all closed end [installment] credit.';
Despite the increases in knowledge, many consumers still were unin-
formed in 1970. Sixty-two percent of those using some form of closed end
credit did not know the APR that they were paying, even after fifteen
months of TIL disclosure. Forty-four percent of those using retail revolving
credit and 37 percent of those using bank credit cards also were unaware of
this rate."( In view of the study's broad definition of "awareness,"17 it
is clear that ignorance did not disappear during the first fifteen months
after the effective date of the Truth-in-Lending Act.
B. Knowledge of Credit Terms for Actual Purchase
The results of this study shed additional light on the situation that ex-
isted in October, 1970. Table 1 compares the estimates of interest rates
with finance charges made by 192 buyers who made a major credit pur-
chase (using cash loans or sales credit) during the year preceding the first
interview. The interest rate estimate was provided directly by the respon-
dent. The estimate of finance charges was combined with estimates of the
purchase price, trade-in value, downpayment, and number of monthly
payments in order to compute an equivalent interest rate.s The large
15 CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 5, at 176.
16 Shay & Schober, Consuner Awareness of Annual Percentage Rates of Charge
in Consumer Instalment Credit: Before and After Truth in Lending Became Effective,
in I NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES 1 (1973).
17 A consumer was classified as "aware of interest rates" if he or she declared
that the rate being paid was 8 percent or above for cars and 12 percent or above for
household durables. A consumer who estimated a rate below these minima, or who
could provide no answer, was classified as "unaware." The minima were based on the
results of a nationwide study to determine the minimum rates actually being paid by
consumers. Although these zones can be supported empirically, they definitely over-
state the level of knowledge. The criteria for developing the zones can be found in
Shay & Schober, supra note 16, at 5-7.




where r = annual rate of interest
m = number of monthly payments in one year
I = total finance charges over life of loan
p = principal of loan
n = number of monthly payments
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proportion of "don't knows" in this category was almost entirely due to
unawareness of the finance charges.
The distributions in Table 1 reflect a general tendency to understate
the interest rate and to overestimate finance charges (especially when the
estimates are compared with the prevailing 1970 interest rates in Califor-
nia of 12-16 percent for-car loans and 18 percent for household durables).
This bias is most evident among car buyers where more than 50 percent
probably understated the actual APR that they were paying. A positive
sign, however, is notable among buyers of household durables, where one-
fourth of the buyers reported estimates of the APR between 17 and 20
percent. A problem remains with the large number of respondents who
were unable to offer any estimate of rates or charges.
Because the consumer estimates of interest rate and finance charge
were biased in opposite directions, only 19 percent of the car buyers and
13 percent of the durables buyers were able to estimate both correctly.' 9
A "correct" extimate is defined as an estimate of 8-30 percent APR for
cars and 12-30 percent for durables. 20 Conversely, almost 40 percent of
both auto and durables buyers gave an incorrect estimate or answered
"don't know" for both credit terms. The remainder got one or the other
correct. These results reflect a high level of misinformation and ignorance
that has not been dispelled by TIL disclosure.
C. Prospects for Improvements in Knowledge of Credit Terms
This study and others have dealt with the knowledge situation within
the fifteen months following the implementation of the Truth-in-Lending
legislation. This is a relatively short period of time given the interval
between major credit purchases; as such, it allows for little accumulation
of experience. An important question is whether the level of knowledge
will continue to improve in the future with additional experience, or con-
versely, whether it will stabilize or decline as credit information loses
saliency through familiarity.
The following section measures consumer knowledge of interest rates
and finance charges after twenty-five months of TIL disclosure and makes
a forecast beyond that point. This forecast will be based on the patterns
in an individual's knowledge (i.e., learning and forgetting) that are masked
by measures of aggregate change in knowledge.
Ideally, one would prefer to assess knowledge of rates and charges for
an actual purchase during both the initial interview and the reinterview.
Because of the limited sample size however, the number of respondents
who made a major credit purchase prior to the first interview (TI) and
19 These results are based on a cross-tabulation of the APR and finance charge
data in Table 1.
20 The definitions for "correct" awareness are modified versions of those used by
Shay and Schober, supra note 16. The lower limits remain the same but an upper
limit is set at 30 percent. An inspection of the eight estimates exceeding the limit
revealed that the respondents either were misinformed about the rates being charged
or were guessing. Furthermore, the existing rate ceilings in California made these
rates improbable.
[VOL. 7:297
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also in the ten months before the re-interview (T2) was too small for re-
liable comparisons. Therefore, in this section the analysis is based on an-
swers to a hypothetical question asked of all respondents at TI and T2.
2 1
Respondents were asked to estimate the total cost (principal plus finance
charges) and the APR that they would pay for a $500 color television set
purchased on a one-year retail installment contract with equal monthly
payments.
For this hypothetical purchase, the "correct" estimate zones of 13-24
percent were quite liberal, at least in light of the prevailing credit costs.
The results in Table 2, when compared with the estimates of terms on an
actual durable purchase (Table 1), are notable for the lower proportions
of "don't know" responses, which in turn appear to have contributed to
the tendency to understate interest rates and overstate finance charges.
Table 2
ESTIMATES OF CREDIT TERMS FOR A HYPOTHETICAL
TELEVISION PURCHASE, T1 AND T2
Ti T2
A. Estimates of APR (October, 1970) (July, 1971)
Too low (< 13%) 45% 42%
Correct (13-24%) 37 47
Too high (> 24%) 4 2
Don't know 14 9
100% 100%
B. Estimates of Finance Charges
Too low (< $30) 3% 5%
Correct ($31-$60) 24 18
Too high (> $60) 66 71
Don't know 7 6
100% 100%
(n= 196) (n-- 196)
The trends from TI to T2 offer a surprising paradox: while the propor-
tion of respondents correctly estimating the APR increased from 37 to 47
21 Although such a hypothetical question can be criticized because it is not based
upon actual experience, it has several notable advantages. First, measures of knowl-
edge can be obtained for nonpurchasers as well as recent buyers of large items. Sec-
ond, it avoids the problem of lack of knowledge of an actual purchase because the
respondent's spouse was more involved in the details of the credit transaction. Third,
a hypothetical question does capture the general impressions which are influential in
the buyer's decisions to utilize credit and compare credit sources. Fourth, the answers
are of uniform quality since the respondents do not have to recall information over
varying periods of time. Furthermore, comparisons between respondents and within
respondents over time are facilitated by the elimination of the particular circum-
stances surrounding the individual purchases. In effect, by giving up an undetermined
amount of external validity, standardization has been gained.
[VOL. 7:297
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percent, the proportion correctly estimating finance charges dropped from
24 to 18 percent. The latter shift is reflected more sharply by the mean
estimate for finance charges, which rose from $93 at TI to $106 at T2.
This represents a jump in the equivalent annual percentage rate of in-
terest from 34 to 39 percent.
1. Measuring Change in Knowledge-A cross-tabulation of T1 and T2
responses from Table 2 shows that the net changes revealed by the cross-
sectional distributions seriously underestimate the total amount of change
(Table 3). In the case of the APR estimates, 25 percent of the sample
were learners (made correct estimate at T2 but not at T1) and 15 per-
cent were forgetters, for a total change of 40 percent, compared with the
net improvement of 10 percent shown in Table 2. Thus, much of the in-
creased awareness was offset by losses of awareness among respondents
who had given correct estimates at T 1.
Table 3
CHANGES IN ESTIMATES OF CREDIT TERMS FOR A
HYPOTHETICAL TELEVISION PURCHASE BETWEEN T1 AND T2









Total 47% 53% 100%




Correct ($31-$60) 7% 17% 24%
Ti learners
Otherc 11% 65% 76%
Total 18% 82% 100%
aChange in knowledge significant at the .05 level (using Goodman-Kruskal Gamma).
bChange in knowledge significant at the .10 level (using Goodman-Kruskal Gamma).
c"Other" responses include "Don't know's" and estimates which were too low or too
high. See Table 2.
The 6 percent net decline in knowledge of finance charges (Table 2)
resulted from 17 percent forgetters versus 11 percent learners, or a total
change by 28 percent of the sample. Because the zones for "correct"
and "incorrect" estimates are so broad, they certainly mask many smaller
WINTER 1974]
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shifts within the zones, which, if measured, would better reflect the de-
gree of learning and forgetting.
2. Forecasting Long-Run Awareness-One interpretation of Table 3
is that the probability of forgetting between TI and T2, given a correct
estimate of the APR at TI, is the same as the probability of learning,
given an incorrect initial estimate. 22 Under these circumstances the num-
ber of learners is greater than the number of forgetters, since more people
gave incorrect estimates at T1. If we assume that the probabilities of
learning and forgetting will continue to be the same after T2 as they were
between TI and T2, then at some point in the future the proportion of
the sample that can give a correct estimate must stabilize at 50 percent.
Whether this will hold true for the rest of the population after T2 depends
first on the representativeness of these data-an issue discussed earlier.
2 3
Secondly, any changes in the environment that would affect the rate of
learning, such as a higher frequency of purchasing or a vigorous educa-
tional campaign, would mean that the probabilities would not be the same
after T2. Since there is no evidence to suggest that such changes in the
environment occured after T2, it is unlikely that knowledge of the actual
APR improved substantially above the levels prevailing in July, 1971 .24
III. TRUTH-IN-LENDING DISCLOSURE
AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
Improving consumer awareness of credit costs is the first goal of the
Truth-in-Lending Act. The second is to stimulate changes in the consum-
er's use of credit; changes which fall into two classes:
1) to facilitate comparison shopping for credit, just as a consumer com-
pares prices, quality, and service for the item; and
2) to encourage more judicious use of credit. Here, disclosure is in-
tended to help consumers choose between credit and use of liquid
assets, or between credit and delayed consumption. 25
A. Comparison Shopping
The effect of TIL disclosure on comparison shopping was measured in
three ways. 26 Each approach has its limitations methodologically and by
22 These probabilities are both .40. For a further discussion of this approach to
analyzing these turnover data see Deutscher, Credit Legislation Two Years Out:
Awareness Changes and Behavioral Effects of Differential Awareness Levels, ch. IV,
in 1 NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, TECHNICAL STUDIES (1973).
23 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
24 Deutscher's work shows that even if the true rate of learning were 20 percent
higher, and the rate of forgetting 20 percent lower, an equilibrium would occur
when 60 percent of the population could make a correct estimate of between 13 and
24 percent. Deutscher, supra note 22, ch. III, at 24-25. Thus, unless credit-buying
patterns change substantially or an effective education campaign is implemented,
consumer knowledge of interest rates probably will remain at current levels.
25 Consumers might also purchase cheaper products and/or use credit plans with
higher downpayments or shorter maturity lengths.
26 Throughout Part III the analysis is based on the representative sample, thereby
making it possible to generalize from the results observed.
[VOL. 7:297
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itself should be used cautiously. Further, given the nature of a single
cross-sectional survey, it is not possible to unravel the causes and effects
of behavioral changes. Despite these qualifications, the cumulative effect
of the three different approaches can yield rich insights into the relation-
ship between TIL disclosure and credit behavior.
1. Noticing Credit Information-The simplest (and most dubious) way
to infer the probable effects of disclosure is to ask respondents what they
did with the information. Such questions are vulnerable to response bi-
ases: respondents realize they should have used the information and they
may color the truth to enhance their image. Nonetheless, self-reports serve
as useful benchmarks.
Consumers xVho made credit purchases between July, 1969, and Octo-
ber, 1970, were asked whether they had noticed any information on the
credit agreement or monthly statements related to the cost of borrowing.
Fifty-seven percent claimed that they had noticed some information.
These answers are classified in Table 4.
Table 4
NOTICE OF CREDIT INFORMATION
BY THOSE WHO MADE CREDIT PURCHASES
Noticed interest rate information 56%
Noticed information on finance charges 43
Noticed payment information (payment amounts and
frequency, number of payments, etc.) 37
Gave other answers 9
Did not give a specific answer 9
*Sums to more than 100% of those who noticed something 154%*
because of multiple responses
(n=140 credit buyers who reported
noticing some information)
The group who had noticed something was then asked whether the in-
formation was useful in any way. The results are reflected in Table 5.
It is notable that only 18 percent of those noticing information (which
is only 9 percent of all credit buyers) indicated that the information
had any effect on past or anticipated behavior.
27
Responses to a similar question asked of all respondents in the survey
offer an interesting comparison. Answering a question about whether
credit sources were required to tell the interest or carrying charges, 92
percent replied "yes." Among the 50 percent of the respondents claiming
to have used the information, behavior changes are noted in Table 6.
From these self-reports, the impact of TIL on comparison shopping
27 This figure, of course, is only suggestive, since buyers may not have recalled
an actual effect or could have reported using the information when in fact they did
not. It is also limited by pertaining only to a single credit purchase.
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Table 5
USE OF CREDIT INFORMATION
BY THOSE WHO MADE CREDIT PURCHASES
Information was not useful 20%
Information did not have a specific
purpose but respondent felt better
knowing the charges and rates 54
Respondent learned how expensive credit was
and would not buy on credit again 9
Respondent used information to compare charges
and rates, or plans to use information to
shop around in the future 9
Gave other responses 8
100%
(n=140 credit buyers who
,reported noticing information)
Table 6
USE OF CREDIT INFORMATION
BY ALL RESPONDENTS IN THE SURVEY
Felt better knowing the charges and rates 45%
Have shopped around more and
compared interest rates 35
Have postponed purchases 13
Sought out a different credit source 4
Learned how expensive credit was
and will not use it again 2
*Includes some multiple responses 99%*
(n=306)
appears substantially greater than the results obtained from respondents
who made actual puchases. Nearly 17 percent of all respondents, including
users and nonusers of the information, claimed that they shopped more or
compared rates. This percentage contrasts with reports of comparison
shopping by only 9 percent of those actually making a major credit pur-
chase during the previous year. The difference is a consequence of im-
plicitly asking respondents about the cumulative utilization of credit in-
formation across many purchases. Unfortunately, such a question is more
prone to inflationary bias than a question on a specific recent purchase.
In any event, it seems clear that TIL is much more likely to encourage
comparison shopping than to result in postponement of a purchase or re-
course to cash payment.
2. Information Disclosure and Comparison of Retailers-A less direct
evaluation of the effects of disclosure on shopping behavior is obtained
[VOL. 7:297
Evaluation of Truth-in-Lending
by determining whether credit buyers chose their retailer on the basis of
either credit availability or better credit terms. In answer to the general
(unaided recall) question, "Why is it that you happened to buy where you
did?", 15 percent of all credit buyers cited past credit experience or
knowledge of availability, while only 6 percent reported that the retailer
had the best credit plan. 28 This is a conservative test of the influence of
credit information for a variety of reasons, 29 but it strongly suggests that
the information provided by TIL will have relatively little influence on
the choice of retailer.
3. Information Disclosure and the Search for Credit-A third approach
to the study of TIL effects utilizes reports of actual behavior rather than
reasons for the behavior. The central question is whether credit users who
were knowledgeable about credit terms were also more likely to seek in-
formation about credit sources or to consider alternative credit sources.
In a cross-sectional survey, it is possible to determine only whether there
is some association between knowledge and behavior. If there is no rela-
tionship, it can then be said that TIL disclosure had no impact on behav-
ior; however, if knowledge and behavior are related, one can only con-
jecture about the direction of causality. It is plausible that those who
searched more actively became knowledgeable about credit rates in the
process, rather than prior knowledge leading to greater search.
Two specific kinds of credit-oriented search were measured: search for
credit information and search for credit sources. Evidence of search for
credit information prior to purchase was based on the responses by credit
buyers shown in Table 7. Twenty-seven percent recalled at least one kind
of search, with car buyers showing a stronger proclivity to seek credit in-
formation. Thirty-six percent of car buyers used at least one outside infor-
Table 7
SEARCH FOR CREDIT INFORMATION
BY CREDIT BUYERS
Proportion answering "yes"
Talked with friends or relatives 12%
Noticed TV, radio, or newspaper advertisement 7%
Visited banks, credit unions, or loan companies 11%
Read mailings from credit sources 5%
(n246 credit buyers)
28 Answers accepted in the best credit plan category included size of downpayment
and monthly payments as well as lower credit costs.
29 The following situations, which were not measured, might have affected the
results of this test: a) the buyer compared the APRs of competing retailers, but
found no differences (this is a very real possibility since virtually all revolving
charge accounts were charging an APR of 18 percent at the time of the study); b)
comparisons made earlier by friends or relatives were used by the buyer during this
purchase process; c) the buyer relied on past credit experience to guide the search;
and finally d) the indirect question used in this instance did not include shopping at
other credit sources.
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mation source, compared with 19 percent for those purchasing household
durables. Active shopping among different types of credit sources, how-
ever, was conducted by only 20 percent of credit buyers. Further, the
differences between car buyers and household durable purchasers were
less pronounced: 23 and 17 percent, respectively, considered a second
credit source beyond the one chosen. A critical problem with this measure
of credit source search is that it considered only inter-type search.30 Since
considerable shopping might have occurred within one type of credit
source such as dealers, stores, or finance companies, the measure used un-
doubtedly underestimates the total amount of search.
A cross-tabulation of the two kinds of search indicates that while 39
percent of the total sample either sought information or actively searched
among sources, only 8 percent conducted both kinds of search.
Knowledge of credit rates is only one of a number of possible influen-
ces on the likelihood of search. Thus a simple cross-classification of search
behavior and knowledge would be misleading. The most obvious con-
founding variable is education. Well-educated consumers are more likely
to be knowledgeable about such concepts as the APR and may engage in
more comparative shopping because their training and past experience
have demonstrated that it is worthwhile. What is needed is a technique
that will hold the influence of such variables as education constant, while
exploring the effect of differences in knowledge.
The statistical technique of regression analysis 31 satisfies this require-
ment, and in this particular situation it was used to hold constant the fol-
lowing effects: education, age, sex, income, and race of the respondent;
number of stores that were shopped by the respondent; and respondent's
reliance on the dealer to make credit arrangements. In essence, the objec-
tive was to measure the influence of knowldge of the APR on the credit
information search and on the credit source search, while holding constant
the relationships between the respondent's knowledge of the APR and
each of the other included variables.
Because of the differences between the way of purchasing cars and
household durables, the sample was dichotomized by the type of pur-
chase, and separate regression equations were computed for car buyers
and household durable buyers. Thus, the association between knowledge
of the APR and search behavior was measured in four separate situations:
equation (1), credit information search by car buyers; equation (2), credit
information search by household durable buyers; equation (3), credit
source search by car buyers; equation (4), credit source search by house-
hold durable buyers.
30 Nine types of credit sources were included in the measure: finance companies,
credit unions, bank installment loans, bank single-payment loans, retail installment
credit, retail charge accounts, bank credit cards, other credit cards (e.g., American
Express), and friends and relatives. The question asked what types of credit sources
were considered, but did not measure the extent of the search for a particular type.
Pretests showed that reliable data were very difficult to obtain on intra-type search.
31 A discussion of this technique can be found in most statistics texts. See, e.g., H.
BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS (2d ed. 1972).
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A significant relationship was found only in equations (1) and (4). Al-
though the influence of knowledge of the APR on search was positive and
statistically significant in each case, the relationships were not particularly
strong in the sense that they greatly altered behavior." '-' This finding, cou-
pled with the fact that there was no significant relationship in the other
two equations, suggests that TIL disclosure has had only a modest influ-
ence on shopping behavior.
B. Disclosure and Credit Usage
In addition to influencing shopping behavior, TIL is concerned with
preventing the excessive and untimely use of credit by consumers who
are ignorant about credit costs. The desired effect would be to help con-
sumers choose between credit and liquid assets (savings or available cash),
or between credit and the postponement of a purchase until cash is avail-
able.
1. Credit Versus Postponement-Earlier it was noted that 6 percent of
all consumers reportedly postponed a purchase after learning the annual
percentage rate of interest or the finance charges. Because the earlier
question referred to all purchases, the responses do not imply that 6 per-
cent of all purchases were postponed, but that 6 percent of the consumers
had delayed at least one purchase after learning the credit terms. This
finding corroborates studies which examined the issue using other method-
ologies.:33
There are a number of reasons that the APR and finance charge infor-
mation is unlikely to reduce actual purchases. First, for a purchase to be
postponable, it must be discretionary. Although urgency of need is diffi-
cult to measure, analysis of this study's data suggests that between 26 and
53 percent of the purchases could not be delayed. In 26 percent of the
cases the household durable or car was needed to replace an item that was
no longer usable. Another 27 percent of the respondents bought the item
for the first time because of an addition to the family or the requirements
of a job change. Replacement purchases were predominant among older
families, whereas younger families were typically first-time buyers.
A second reason relates to the previously noted tendency for consumers
to overestimate finance charges. 34 This tendency leads to the competing
hypothesis that disclosure encouraged use of credit by some consumers
32 According to the regression models, correct knowledge of the APR in the hypo-
thetical purchase situation was associated with a 0.19 increase in the probability that
one or more information sources were considered by car buyers, and a 0.16 increase
in the probability that household durables buyers considered one or more credit
sources.
33 Friedman found that replacing monthly rates and add-on rates with correct
APRs did not alter the acceptability of installment contracts. See Friedman, Using
Simulation Techniques to Predict the Behavioral Effects of New Laws: The Case of
Truth in Lending Legislation and the Consumer, 54 JOURNAL OF APPLtED PSYCHOL-
OGY 297-301 (1970).
34 See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
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who found credit less costly in terms of dollars than they originally be-
lieved.
Finally, disclosure is not likely to lead to postponement of purchases if
consumers believe that the advantages of immediate ownership outweigh
the cost of financing.
35
2. Credit Versus Liquid Assets-One indication of TIL's effect on the
decision to use credit or liquid assets comes from replies to a self-report
question which showed that between 1 and 3 percent of all purchasers
would not buy on credit in the future.
A superior test, however, would measure the relationship between
knowledge of the APR and the actual decision to use cash versus credit.
That is, are those who correctly estimate the APR in a hypothetical sit-
uation more likely to use cash for a major purchase? Like the credit
search decisions discussed earlier, there are a multitude of possible infl-
ences on the cash-credit decision which must be considered. The appro-
priate solution is again to use regression analysis to hold the other vari-
ables constant and. thereby to focus directly on the role of knowledge.
This analysis found that there was no significant relationship between
knowledge and the choice of the use of cash rather than credit. Unless
there is a systematic difference between the accuracy of credit rate knowl-
edge in a hypothetical as opposed to an actual situation, this finding is
fairly compelling evidence that TIL disclosure did not lead to greater
usage of cash.
While reliance on credit was positively related to the number of credit
sources used during the past five years, the existing indebtedness, and the
purchase price, it was negatively related to the availability of savings in a
bank or at a savings and loan institution. All these relationships were
highly significant. For example, the probability of buying on credit in-
creased by .09 as the price went from $100 to $1000. Similarly, the
probability of using credit dropped by .20 for consumers with a savings
and loan account. The predominance of these situational variables, once
previous credit buying experience was taken into account, indicates that
demographic and socio-economic variables played a minor role in the
cash-credit decision. It is notable that a composite variable used as a proxy
for the attitude toward the use of credit had no impact on the likelihood
of choosing credit. If past credit experience and availability of cash re-
serves were the influences, rather than the feeling that credit was the best
way to buy, it is not surprising that changes in knowledge about the APR
had little effect on the choice between using cash or buying on credit.
The importance of cash reserves in the cash versus credit decision is
reflected in the responses of credit buyers when asked whether they could
have paid cash for the item had they wanted to do so (Table 8).
Most of the cash-poor buyers were younger families with children, in-
comes below $7500, no savings, and heavy nonmortgage debt burdens
relative to income. Furthermore, these families had demands for addi-




PROPORTIONS OF CASH AND CREDIT BUYERS
Cash buyers 43%
28% cash available
Credit buyers 57% -. 72% cash not available
Total buyers 100%
(n=460)
tional purchases that were likely to continue for some time into the fu-
ture.
These results lead to the conclusion that, "[tihe benefits of rate dis-
closure for comparing rates received on savings to rates paid for the use
of credit accrued principally to more affluent consumers. '3 6
IV. INHERENT LIMITATIONS ON THE
POTENTIAL OF DISCLOSURE
The remainder of this article will examine why the information dis-
closed by TIL holds little promise for changing credit shopping patterns
in the near future. In evaluating those limitations it is important to dis-
tinguish the preferences, knowledge, and characteristics of consumers
using credit from the nature of the credit transaction itself.
To explore the persistent arguments that low-income and minority con-
sumers are more constrained in their search for credit, particular attention
will be paid to the behavior patterns of these groups.37 One important
hypothesis is that availability of credit is the major problem for these
groups to overcome. Consumers in poverty areas
know that merchants or credit agencies with lower charges are
not going to extend credit to them. A person who scarcely
knows where the money for his next meal is coming from is not
going to worry much about the risk involved in obtaining some
needed goods when he does not know where next month's and
next year's instalments are coming from.38
Consumers who are concerned with the availability of credit in the
course of whatever shopping they do, are also likely to put more emphasis
on the size of the monthly payment, rather than the APR or the total cost
of the credit.
39
In order to focus on the special problems of low-income and minority
buyers, the data base will include the combined representative and black
3 6 I d. at 182.
37 See generally, Note, supra note 3; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A
Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1968).
38 Kripke, supra note 9, at 6.
39 T. JUSTER & R. SHAY, supra note 6, at 2.
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samples. This will affect only the proportions belonging to the income and
racial groups and not the relationships being studied.
A. Credit in the Context of the Decisionmaking Process
1. Decisionniaking Criteria-One approach to the hypothesis that the
availability of credit and the size of the monthly payment are the most
important criteria for choosing a credit source, especially for low-income
minority households, is to ask the question directly. This is somewhat
risky, as such questions are prone to elicit biased answers from respon-
dents who feel that every aspect of the credit decision is extremely impor-
tant. This apparently occurred to some extent among low-income minor-
ity respondents, although it can be argued that their increased concern
was justified. Virtually everyone said that it was important to know the
interest rates and finance charges, since it would have been hard for them
to answer otherwise and still have been considered reasonable or careful
buyers. Nonetheless, some of the differences between the responses of the
different income and racial groups were significant.
The results clearly support the hypothesis that low-income minorities
are much more concerned than others about the size of the downpayment
and weekly payments. Comparing low-income families (white and minor-
ity) with high-income whites (incomes greater than $7500) shows that
low-income minorities were far more concerned 1) that payments be low,
2) that downpayments be minimal, and 3) that the maturity period be
long (Table 9). Comparisons on the level of interest rates and knowledge
of the rates and charges were not of value, because all groups considered
them to be extremely or very important.
40
A key question is whether low-income minority buyers were able to
satisfy their need for low downpayments and small weekly or monthly
payments. This is difficult to answer because one way to keep payments
low is to buy cheaper versions of a particular product, and there was no
way in this study to compare products directly.
Another way to lower payments is by extending the maturity length of
the contract. Evaluating contracts on this basis presents several problems.
First, the relationship between payment size and maturity length is pro-
bably not well understood by credit buyers, judging by the small propor-
tion of any group who regarded long payment periods as an important
criterion. Second, the payment terms depend partly on the negotiating
ability of the two parties to the contract. To the extent that there was
40 If it is assumed that the differences in responses to the last three questions
were attributable to response bias, the average upward bias was not more than 6 or
7 percent. Thus, only one-third of high-income whites considered the size of the
downpayment and the monthly or weekly payment important, compared with two-
thirds of the low-income minorities who bought on credit. It is not clear why low-




RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF CRITERIA
FOR CHOOSING A CREDIT SOURCE
Proportion of Difference in judgments
whites with between whites with income
income > > $7500
$7500 saying and
Criteria for criterion was Whites Minorities
choosing a extremely or with income with income
credit source very important < $7500 < $7500
Low weekly or
monthly payments 32% ±6% +38%
Low downpayments 32 -1-7 +34
Long payment periods 16 +4 + 18
Friendliness of
credit people 65 -9 + I
Ease of paperwork 77 -8 + 7
Previous experience
with credit source 38 -9 +12
variability in maturity length, creditors would endeavor both to reduce the
length of the payment period and to require large downpayments from
high risk borrowers.
The data indicate that creditors have succeeded in overcoming the pref-
erence of low-income minority borrowers for longer maturity lengths. For
items costing more than $500, 40 percent of the low-income whites had
installment contracts exceeding thirty months, compared with 24 percent
for the low-income minorities. The same pattern is reflected for less ex-
pensive items, where 44 percent of low-income whites had contracts ex-
ceeding twenty months, while only 21 percent of low-income minorities
had such contracts. Thus, based on limited data it appears that low-in-
come minorities found it more difficult to lower their monthly payments
by increasing the number of payments.
2. Importance of the Credit Decision-Although the vast majority of
credit buyers reported that knowing the credit rates and charges was ex-
tremely important in choosing a credit source, this alone does not jus-
tify the conclusion that the information will be used. The results in Table
10, showing which of the major decisions in the purchase process were
most difficult to make, illustrate the relative unimportance of credit deci-
sions. Even if the store or dealer choice is included as a credit-related
decision, less than 25 percent of those in the sample thought that these
decisions were one of the two most difficult. The other product-related
decisions, concerning the amount. to spend and the model and brand
choices, were considered most difficult by approximately three-fourths of
the respondents, regardless of whether cash was available for the pur-
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chase. 4' The fact that the choice of a store was the easiest decision to
make suggests that once the product-related decisions were made, all but
one of the store alternatives were eliminated.
Table 10
































These findings help to explain why the impact of disclosure informa-
tion and the inclination to search for credit were so minor compared with
other shopping activities. For example, among buyers of household dura-
bles, almost 60 percent contemplated the purchase for at least several
months; 67 percent considered two or more brands; and 52 percent
shopped at more than one store.4 2 For car buyers the extent of dealer
41 This behavior is consistent with the theory of perceived risk, which postulates
that consumers seek to minimize the risk they perceive in a purchase situation. For
major purchases, the performance risk (e.g., will the product work and meet my
needs?) is normally quite high. The social risk (e.g., will my family and friends ap-
prove of my decision?) is also significant for major purchases. For most consumers,
finding a way to reduce these perceived risks, which must be lived with daily, is more
important than reducing the extra financial risk of higher credit costs, which is only
felt once a month.
42 Brandt & Day, Decision Processes for Major Durables: An Empirical View, in
AMERICAN MARKETING ASS'N, COMBINED PROCEEDINGS-1971 SPRING AND FALL CON-




























search was greater, with more than 75 percent visiting at least two deal-
ers.
B. The Role of the Retailer
To understand why consumers consider credit decisions relatively easy
to make it is necessary to examine how and where they choose credit
sources. One important way to resolve the credit decision is to shift the
decision to the retailer. To the extent that consumers rely on the retailer
for credit, the potential of TIL disclosure is diminished.
1. Reliance on the Retailer-Retail credit, either charge accounts or in-
stallment plans, was used by nearly 40 percent of the buyers in the sam-
ple (Table 11). Although the figures in Table I do not distinguish be-
tween cars and household durables, they do indicate that minority buyers
used retail credit to a much greater extent than did whites.4 3
Table 11
USE OF RETAIL CREDIT
White Minority
Percent of credit Income Income Income Income
buyers using < $7500 t $7500 < $7500 < $7500 Total
Retail charge account 10% 15% 30% 28% 19%
Retail installment plan 22 19 20 13 19
Total 32% 34% 50% 41% 38%
Number of cases (42) (160) (50) (60) (312)
Even those who borrowed from banks or finance companies tended to
turn over the credit source decision to the retailer: 86 percent in the case
of finance company loans, and 56 percent for bank installment loans. The
race-income breakdown summarized in Table 12 reveals some striking
Table 12
FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS BY BUYER OR DEALER
Arrangements White Minority
for finance White Minority
company or Income Income Income Income
bank loans < $7500 $7500 < $7500 - $7500 Total
Made by buyer 23% 50% 17% 15% 34%
Made by dealer 77 50 83 85 66
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of cases (22) (68) (18) (26) (134)
43 The same response pattern held true when the products were analyzed separately.
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differences. Among both minority and low-income white buyers, only
one in five arranged for his own financing through banks or finance com-
panies. Half of the middle- and upper-income white buyers arranged for
their own financing.
Combining retail credit and dealer-arranged loans at banks and finance
companies shows that two-thirds of all credit buyers relied on the re-
tailer to make arrangements for credit (Table 13). Again we observe that
Table 13
PROPORTION OF BUYERS RELYING
ON RETAIL OR DEALER-ARRANGED CREDIT
White Minority
Income Income Income Income




arranged credit 71% 55% 80% 79% 66%
Number of cases (42) (160) (50) (60) (312)
even fewer minority or low-income white purchasers were actively in-
volved in the credit decision. These findings lend credence to the crit-
icism that TIL primarily helps middle- and upper-income whites who, it
is argued, have discretion over the choice of the credit source.
2. Reasons for Reliance on the Retailer for Credit-The relationship
between the retailer and the buyer is an important element in the credit
source decision. What is not apparent is whether the buyer relies on the
retailer for credit out of necessity or convenience. The importance of the
former reason depends on whether the buyer perceives that credit is avail-
able from alternative sources. Conversely, the buyer may prefer to deal
with a particular retailer either because of past credit experience with that
retailer or convenience.
a. Credit Availability-One measure of the influence of credit avail-
ability on the choice of a credit source is provided by asking the buyer
whether the purchase would have been made at another retailer had suf-
ficient cash been available. The figure of 12 percent of the buyers using
credit who would have bought elsewhere represents the lower limit of the
constraint improsed by availability (Table 14). Some buyers who would
not have changed their choice of retailer might have been expressing their
overall satisfaction with the retailer they chose. Thus, for almost nine out
of ten credit buyers, the question of credit availability apparently did not
significantly influence the choice of a retailer. The only qualification con-
cerns low-income minority buyers, but even here almost three out of four
credit buyers said they would not have bought elsewhere.
b. Past Experience-Table 15 shows that 25 percent of car buyers and
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Table 14
CREDIT BUYERS WHO WOULD HAVE BOUGHT ELSEWHERE
White Minority
Income Income Income Income




where had they been
able to pay cash 17% 7% 27% 7% 12%
Number of cases (41) (155) (49) (57) (302)
68 percent of household durable purchasers had previously purchased
from the retailer chosen for the most recent purchase. For cars, this expe-
rience was far more prevalent among higher-income families, who had
probably purchased many more cars on the average than other families.
For lower-priced household durables, income per se was less impor-
tant, but in this situation low-income minorities were more inclined to re-
turn to a familiar store. Among low-income buyers, whites and minorities
differed substantially, but only in the likelihood of having made a previous
purchase for cash. In appraising the failure to find an income effect, it
should be noted that low-income buyers probably patronized fewer stores
in the past as a consequence of less extensive purchasing activity. This
suggests that they relied on past experience to a greater extent because
they were acquainted with a smaller set of retailers.
c. Convenience-One widely held assumption about low-income con-
sumers is that they lack mobility and thus are forced to buy from neigh-
borhood stores. A corollary assumption is that these consumers tend to
avoid large department stores because they are too impersonal and un-
friendly. Hence, neighborhood retailers, which typically have higher
prices, are thought to survive because they have a "captive market." This
was decidedly not the case in California. For both car and household du-
rable purchases, nearly 90 percent of all credit buyers reported that they
traveled at least a few miles to make a purchase.
It is difficult to determine whether this result was peculiar to the
sprawling nature of most California cities. If this were a factor, however,
we would expect most buyers to report that they lived some distance from
a major shopping center; in general, this was not the case. 44
Thus, low-income buyers and minorities were not particularly con-
strained in their choice of retailer by a) a lack of credit availability, at
least from other retailers, b) their unwillingness to consider unfamiliar
retailers (as measured by the likelihood of having an idea where they
44 An analysis of credit buyers showed that 23 percent lived within a few blocks
of a major shopping center, and 83 percent lived within a few miles.
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Table 15
PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE AT RETAILER SELECTED
FOR CREDIT PURCHASE
(Proportion of credit buyers)
White Minority
Income Income Income Income










































aIncluding previous purchases where both cash and credit were used.
could obtain credit before starting shopping and their reliance on past
relationships), or c) their need for convenience or proximity to the re-
tailer (as measured by the distance traveled to make the credit purchase).
The weakness of this analysis is that it concentrates on the reasons for
selecting a particular retailer. The remaining question is whether those
who relied on retailer-arranged credit did so because they perceived that
other sources of credit were either inaccessible or more expensive.
C. Perception of Credit Sources
1. Perceived Accessibility-Respondents were asked to assess how dif-
ficult it would be for them to obtain credit from major cash lending










extremely or very difficult to borrow from by more than 17 percent of
the total sample (Table 16). Judging from the small proportion of "don't
know" responses, knowledge about accessibility was widespread and uni-
form throughout the sample, with the exception of knowledge about credit
unions.
Table 16
PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY OF BORROWING MONEY
OR GETTING CREDIT
(Proportion saying source is extremely
or very difficult to borrow from, or
not knowing the difficulty)
White Minority
Income Income Income Income



















































The differences in perceived accessibility between racial and income
groups are helpful in explaining why low-income buyers seldom consid-
ered getting credit from sources other than retailers. First, more low-
income buyers felt that store installment credit was most accessible: only
about 15 percent of these buyers reported that it would be difficult to use
this source. In contrast, 19 to 25 percent of low-income whites and 25
to 44 percent of low-income minorities believed that other sources were
more inaccessible for them.
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These results contradict the widely held belief that the small local re-
tailer is a ready source of credit for minorities and the poor. 45 While it
is not clear exactly what the respondents had in mind when asked about
small stores, minorities rated them less accessible than retail charge plans,
which would presumably be obtained from larger stores.
Credit unions were the only source for which race was not a significant
determinant of perceived accessibility. This finding coupled with the con-
sensus that credit rates were below average at credit unions suggest that
minorities would have found this an attractive source; nevertheless, credit
unions were seldom used in low-income buyers, regardless of race. The
high levels of "don't know" responses to the question about the ease of
borrowing from credit unions (35 percent for low-income whites and 23
percent for low-income minorities-three times the levels for other
sources) illustrate a lack of information about and experience with credit
unions among low-income consumers. Since credit unions have in the past
obtained loanable funds from their members, it is understandable that
middle- and upper-income consumers, who have greater access to credit
unions, were more familiar with this source.
Consumer ignorance about credit unions was apparently not the result
of their restrictive lending policies for, as can be seen in Table 17, con-
sumers with experience at credit unions found them very accessible.
Table 17
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BORROWING EXPERIENCE
AND PERCEPTION OF ACCESSIBILITY
(Proportion of user and nonuser groups saying
that it is "not at all" or "not very difficult"
to borrow from the source)
Users of source Difterence
within past 5 Nonusers of (users-
years the source nonusers)
Bank installment loans 80% 62% 18%
(n=294) (n=499)
Finance company loans 75% 69% 6%
(n=196) (n=597)
Credit union loans 93% 50% 43%
(n=168) (n=625)
Retail charge credit 83% 74% 9%
(n=194) (n=599)
These findings suggest that wider usage of credit unions requires that
they somehow reduce their restrictions on membership, which under pres-
45 It should be noted that small stores often sell only for cash or on a 30-day-
charge basis, especially in low-income areas where they cannot sell their paper.
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ent circumstances are a matter of statutory law. Whether some of the low-
income buyers who were unaware of the lending policies of credit unions
might have been eligible for membership cannot be answered with the
available data. Nonetheless, it is evident that credit unions suffer in mar-
ket coverage compared with banks, finance companies, and retailers.
2. Perceived Cost Differences-If low-income and minority consumers
rely on retailers for credit because it is more accessible, do they realize
that credit rates are probably higher from these sources? The data in
Table 18 demonstrate that respondents discriminated realistically among
Table 18
PERCEIVED ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATES OF
ALTERNATIVE CREDIT SOURCES
(Proportion saying that interest rate
of credit source is above average
or unable to estimate)
Credit Source < $750(
A. Finance Company
Above average rates 60%
Don't know (29%)
B. Retail Charge Account*
Above average rates 24
Don't know (28)
C. Bank Credit Card
Above average rates 23
Don't know (42)
D. Bank Installment Loan
Above average rates 16
Don't know (26)
E. Bank Single Payment Loan
Above average rates 8
Don't know (34)
F. Credit Union
Above average rates 8
Don't know (43)




< $7500 $7500 Total
75% 56% 65% 68%
(15%) (30%) (15%) (20%)
38 26 33 33
(14) (28) (19) (20)
28 19 24 25
(22) (40) (30) (30)
14 17 15 16
(13) (29) (17) (18)
9 11 14 9













:Distributions for retail charge accounts and retail installment loans were nearly
identical.
the costs of alternative credit sources. There was strong consensus that
finance companies were above average in cost, followed by retailer ac-
counts (charge and installment), bank cards, bank installment loans, single-
payment bank loans, and credit unions. The differences in perception by
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These findings are consistent with the responses to the question, "Do
you feel that the differences in credit costs from one place to another are
great enough to make it worthwhile to shop around?" The results are
shown in Table 19.
Table 19
RESPONSE TO QUESTION REGARDING
WHETHER CREDIT COSTS JUSTIFIED SHOPPING
Yes, should shop around 81%
Yes, but unable to shop for credit 3
Differences insufficient to justify shopping 16
100%
Thus, most consumers, regardless of race or income level, appear to
have had a reasonable level of institutional knowledge or intuitive feel
about credit sources. They knew which sources offered the lowest rates,
and they believed that there were significant differences in rates between
sources, and that shopping for credit would save them money. Given this
level of general knowledge, why did the data show such widespread usage
of high-cost sources (occasioned in part by reliance on the dealer) and
very limited consideration of alternative sources?
The following points help to answer this question. First, many low-
income and minority consumers believed that their attempts to borrow
from lower-cost sources would be thwarted. This was clearly true where
credit unions were unavailable and perhaps true of some stores and banks
which had more stringent borrowing conditions. In other cases, the real
constraints may have been low, but the barriers perceived by low-income
and minority buyers were still formidable. From their past experiences
(and those of their friends and relatives) these consumers may have felt
the frustration and futility of trying to borrow from lower-cost sources.
Regardless of their current financial situation, the bitter aftertaste of these
attempts may have often stifled their motivation to find cheaper credit.
Second, it was earlier found that the credit decision was not crucial
when compared to product decisions. Respondents may have answered
that it was worth shopping for credit, but during the purchase process-
after finding an item with the right color, size, brand, and price, and with
a salesman pressing for a sale-the thought of shopping for cheaper credit
was not a salient issue.
Finally, even if the credit decision were important, concern about lower
monthly payments and lower downpayments would motivate a consumer
to shop more than would the cost of credit. In reality, the easier the pay-
ment terms become, the greater the likelihood that the interest rate will
rise to cover the increased risk.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Truth-in-Lending Act held promise for dramatic changes in the
ways in which consumer credit was perceived and used by both consumers
and credit sources. Increased consumer understanding about credit terms,
resulting from TIL, was expected to stimulate comparison shopping for
credit and to encourage more judicious usage of credit. This, in turn,
would promote more effective price competition in the consumer credit
industry. While some changes were observed during the surveys of Cal-
ifornia consumers, it must be concluded that to date the higher hopes of
the Truth-in-Lending Act remain unfulfilled.
On the positive side, however, consumer knowledge about interest rates
has improved substantially-particularly among middle- and upper-
income groups. With repeated disclosure and experience with credit, the
depth of understanding by these consumers should continue to grow. Un-
fortunately, the evidence also shows that the breadth of knowledge, i.e.,
the proportions of consumers aware of credit terms, will probably not rise
much above current levels without additional disclosure provisions, edu-
cational campaigns, or changes in the market structure for credit.
Although most consumers are still generally uninformed about credit
terms, current awareness levels may be sufficient to "police the market."
in the sense of acting as a price-sensitive segment that is large enough to
encourage viable competition on the basis of the APR.
Despite the rise in consumer knowledge, the effect of disclosure on
actual purchase behavior has been minimal. Some consumers reported
that they might use the credit information in the future, but among those
having used credit since TIL, knowledge about credit terms had very
little influence on their comparison shopping, either among retailers or
credit sources. In the decisions to postpone purchases or to use cash in-
stead of credit, knowledge of credit terms played no role whatsoever.
Evaluating the real impact of TIL is complicated by the nature of the
credit decision process. First, most credit buyers have little choice other
than to use credit if they are to make a desired purchase. Second, the
credit decisions are dominated by product-related decisions. Once the pro-
duct and brand decisions are made, the choice of a particular retailer
becomes almost a default decision. Since the retailer also serves as the
source of credit (either through retail credit plans or by arranging outside
credit) to a large majority of consumers, the credit source decision re-
ceives even lower priority. Among low-income and minority buyers, the
lack of credit availability may lead to this strong reliance on the retailer,
but convenience and past experience appear to be even stronger influen-
ces. Finally, some low-income buyers, who are rationed in the sense that
they can not obtain as much credit as they would like, emphasize the size
of the downpayment and monthly payments in their consideration of
credit alternatives.
In view of the numerous environmental influences on the various credit
decisions, it is not surprising that the disclosure of credit terms by itself
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has had only a modest effect on credit search behavior and no percep-
tible impact on the choice between cash and the use of liquid assets.
However, Truth-in-Lending does represent a significant step toward en-
hancing the consumer's "right to know." Improvements in knowledge of
credit terms have occurred, but once again the benefits have not accrued
equally to low-income and minority consumers. A major challenge re-
mains: to educate these consumers about the true costs of credit. But, the
greater task is to encourage changes in buying patterns and in the credit
market so that consumers can use the information effectively.
